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ABSTRACT 
 
Most resource-rich countries in Africa are introducing or reinforcing Local Content Policies (LCPs) 
and regulations to propel socio-economic development since its introduction in the North Sea. 
Local content is now a prerequisite for granting exploration license to international oil companies 
(IOCs) and suppliers in the Gulf of Guinea region (GGR). The paper analyses and compares LCPs 
- successes and impediments factors - from two perspectives: the North Sea – Norway, UK, and 
Denmark; and the Gulf of Guinea – Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Equatorial Guinea to glean 
policy lessons for the Gulf of Guinea countries. The study of the comparator countries found that 
the policy implementation in the GGR is constrained, inter alia by inadequate infrastructure, 
industrial base and supplier base, technical and financial capacity of domestic firms and weak 
regulatory institutions. Also, the LC policy is overly ambitious and prescriptive which ignores the 
GGR’s state of industrial development. To engineer resource-based development in the GGR 
these countries must move beyond its preoccupation with local content regulations to addressing 
the above challenges conducive for the development of linkages.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Natural resources have the potential to spur 
socio-economic development in host countries as 
happened in America, Canada, Norway and 
Australia. These same resources have the 
potential to deepen underdevelopment as the 
seminal work of Sachs and Warner [1] found a 
negative correction between natural resource 
abundance and economic growth. In Africa, 
petroleum and mineral resources have been a 
major catalyst of underdevelopment, political 
instability, and environmental pollution termed as 
the resource curse. The resource curse, 
according to Obiri et al. [2] is a paradox which 
connotes that, countries with more natural 
resources turned to be underdeveloped than 
countries without natural resources. The 
predominant justification for resource curse is 
Dutch disease, coined as a result of the 
immediate hardship in Netherlands that followed 
the discovery of O&G in the North Sea, Europe 
[3]. 
 
Dutch disease is a concept where improvements 
in one sector lead (i.e. extractive industry) to a 
decline in others (i.e. agriculture sector and 
manufacturing sector) [4]. Other studies posit 
different explanations to the resource curse 
theory: Ross [5,6], Jensen and Wantchekon [7], 
Collier and Hoeffler [8] and Hodler [9] argued that 
there is always a negative relationship between 
quality of the governance system and resource 
wealth and; Robinson et al. [10] postulated that 
resource-rich countries with accountable 
institutions and state competence tend to 
achieve positive impacts from the use of their 
natural resources. Put differently, the effect of a 
natural resource on an economy is dependent on 
the institutional quality of the resource country.  
 
To address this resource curse, countries in the 
Gulf of Guinea region are implementing Local 
Content Policies (LCPs) to maximise benefits 
and build linkages in the economy through four 
main pillars: employment creation, procurement 
of goods and services, knowledge transfer and 
skills development. Despite the increasing 
adoption of this policy, Veloso [11] argued that 
little empirical evidence available on the policy’s 
impact on economies are mixed. Proponents of 
LCPs argue that the policy correct market failure 
and creates value addition [12] and protect infant 
industries and with time local companies can 
partner multinationals [12,13]. The policy has the 
potential to generate sustained and inclusive 
growth through economic diversification and 
employment opportunities [14].  
On the other hand, others counter these 
arguments that the policy violates World Trade 
Organisation rules (the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, the agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, the Agreement on 
Trade in services, and the Agreement on 
Government Procurement). However, there is a 
consensus that a well-drafted LCPs cognizant of 
the developmental state of the host country could 
impact the economy positively. Consequently, 
the paper compares local content policies in the 
comparator countries to determine the factors 
that impede LCP implementation, and what 
causes the LCPs to be successful. The central 
focus of the paper differs from previous studies 
which focused on local content implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement of regulations on 
employment and training etc. from the 
perspective of the oil companies. This 
comparative analysis is to glean successful 
lessons to improve policy implementation in 
GGR, West Africa. Qualitative analysis is used to 
identify the thematic issues occurring in the case 
countries which subsequently serves as a policy 
recommendation for LCP improvement in GGR. 
In nutshell, this paper contributes to the literature 
on the subject by highlighting policy lessons from 
the comparator countries which emphasise the 
importance of addressing local content 
challenges in the Gulf of Guinea region. In this 
respect, the paper is divided into four sections: 
section one introduces the topic, section two and 
three analysis LCPs from the comparator regions 
with justifications for the adopted countries. 
Section four and five deal with findings and 
discussion, and conclusion respectively. 
 
2. LOCAL CONTENT DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE NORTH SEA 
 
Local content policies (LCPs) as an industrial 
policy in the oil and gas sector to support             
broad-based economic growth were first 
introduced in the North Sea, Europe in the 1970s 
which comprised restrictions on imports to direct 
state intervention in the oil sector [12]. In addition 
to being the source of this policy in the petroleum 
sector, another consideration given for the choice 
of the underlisted countries is the successfulness 
of the policy implementation. The policy analysis 
of these countries is discussed next.  
 
2.1 Norway 
 
The country’s upstream petroleum activities 
started in the mid-1960s, and the first offshore 
field came on stream in 1971. The key principle 
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that drove oil exploration is the idea of collective 
ownership of petroleum resources within Norway 
by the state. This principle is reflected in 
subsequent legislation such as Norwegian 
Petroleum law in 1965 and later, the            
Petroleum Act (Act No. 72 of 29 November 1996) 
and the National Petroleum Regulations 
(Regulation No. 653 of 27 June 1997) which 
provided the basis for licenses acquisition. This 
became necessary as a result of government oil 
policy to create domestic suppliers and thereby 
ensure maximum benefit from natural resources 
in the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). 
Subsequently, in 1971, the Sorting (Parliament) 
of Norway produced what is now known as the 
“the 10 Oil Commandments” comprising the 
following:  
 
 The exploitation of petroleum in NCS 
should ensure energy security for the 
country; 
 Development of new industry based on 
petroleum; 
 The oil industry must be cognizant of 
existing industrial activities and the 
protection of nature and the environment; 
 The involvement of the Norwegian state at 
all appropriate levels of the oil industry and 
creation of an integrated oil community 
with a focus on national and international 
participation; 
 Future large-scale discovery present new 
tasks for Norway’s foreign policy [15]; and 
others.   
 
These general principles resulted in a new 
administrative structure based on different 
functional responsibilities in 1972: 
 
 Policy-making - The Ministry of         
Petroleum and Energy deals with decision-
making and award of licenses. All 
development plans are finally approved by 
parliament.  
 Technical control and resource 
management - The Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate is responsible for technical 
oversight of the fields and advises the 
sector ministry. 
 Commercial participation – the 
establishment of a state-owned oil 
company, Statoil in 1972 to take care of 
commercial interest on behalf of the 
government, and to counterbalance the 
IOCs operating in Norway [16]. In 2015, it 
was estimated that Statoil controls about 
70% of oil production in Norway [17]. In 
2001, Petoro and Gassco were established 
to manage the State’s direct financial 
interest (SDFI) in the industry and manage 
the gas transport network from NCS 
respectively.  
 
All the institutional structure and the policy 
framework helped developed competitive 
domestic suppliers. In making room for local 
firms to compete, decrees (article 54, §54) were 
passed to ensure local goods and services are 
given preferences when goods are competitive in 
price, quality, service and schedule [2]. This is 
similar to British firms having ‘full and fair 
opportunity’ (FFO) to compete for business. Here 
again, Goods and Services Office was 
established as in the case of Offshore Suppliers 
Office (OSO) in the UK to monitor and                  
assist local firms in partnering IOCs and 
establishing a target for indigenous participation 
in the industry. Furthermore, a Supplier 
Development Program was established by the 
government to enhance production links between 
Norwegian firms and IOCs which helped created 
industry clusters [18]. According to Obiri et al. [2], 
through government interventions and existing 
infrastructure and industrial based, local 
companies were able to develop and propelled to 
international standards. These industry 
competencies were easily adjusted and extended 
into the oil and gas industry which consists of the 
following: 
 
 The shipbuilding industry, manufacture of 
ship equipment and shipyards for handling 
offshore operations, 
 Availability of large process facilities, 
 The mining industry existing skills were 
relevant to the oil and gas industry. For 
instance, geological competence was 
relevant for O&G mapping and 
interpretation of seismic data [16]. 
 
In addition to the above, Norway had an 
advanced academic environment at the time of 
the discoveries which provided a base for 
domestic knowledge. Again, oil companies              
were encouraged during concessions 
negotiations to enter into R&D projects with local 
universities and research institutions (ibid). This 
helped enlarged local knowledge base and 
provided the industry with the requisite 
personnel. Table 1 lists local content incentives 
in Norway.  
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Table 1. Norwegian local-content incentives 
 
1. Norwegian local-content incentive focussed on the production chain. 
2. Foreign firms were required to transfer technology to their Norwegian counterparts, as 
enshrined in the licenses. 
3. Petroleum multinationals acted as technical assistants to Statoil and smaller Norwegian firms 
that were legally the operators of the oil and gas assets-essentially fast-tracking Norwegian 
companies to competent operators. 
4. Firms were required to conduct at least 50% of the research for the technology needed to 
develop assets at local Norwegian institutions. 
5. The preferences for local firms – when competitive regarding price and quality- continued until 
1996, when EU legislation required the Government to give equal access to all operators 
regardless of origin.  
Source: Acheampong et al. [19] 
 
2.2 United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom until its ascension into the 
European Single Market has been implementing 
a loose form of local content policy in the North 
Sea since the 1960s. In other words, the local 
content was less interventionist as happened in 
Norway which was a state-led policy at the early 
stages of oil production [20]. UK implemented a 
discretionary licensing system for petroleum 
contracts with an emphasis on rapid exploration 
and development (E&P) programme and the 
companies’ usage of local suppliers [21]. Despite 
the country’s long-established O&G industry 
supply chain, it was small and limited in offshore 
capability. The 1970s witnessed demand for an 
increased in local content in the North Sea due to 
the following events: 
 
 The discovery of large oil fields in the 
northern North Sea; 
 Concerns for the security of oil supply from 
the Middle East due to unstable events; 
 Labour militancy in the coal mining industry 
threatening domestic energy supplies; 
 Decline viability in heavy engineering and 
shipbuilding industries in the host 
communities in Scotland;  
 Nationalist sentiment in Scotland on the 
increased resulting in the saying “It’s 
Scotland’s oil [21,22,23].  
 
Consequent to the above the Heath 
administration published IMEG Report on the 
potential industrial benefits of North Sea 
development and the following recommendations 
were adopted: 
 
 Establishment of an organisation to 
improve the performance of the British 
offshore industry; 
 A confidential quarterly report by operators 
and contractors outlining their purchases, 
staff employment and sub-contractors 
explaining purchases and tendering 
practices and future requirements; 
 A means of assessing whether British firms 
have ‘full and fair opportunity’ (FFO) to 
compete for business in the United 
Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) O&G 
licensing system; 
 Providing credit facilities to British firms to 
counter cheap export credit from overseas 
suppliers; 
 Encouraging joint venture between 
domestic firms and foreign suppliers to 
‘plug’ gaps in British industrial capability; 
and 
 Availability of information and advice 
service to British suppliers [22,23].  
 
Accordingly, Offshore Suppliers Office (OSO) 
was established in 1973 to put into effect the 
adopted recommendations. Among some of its 
touted success is the incorporation of FFO 
clause in all license application and monitoring its 
compliance.  A non-binding Code of Practice was 
latter agreed between the United Kingdom 
Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) and 
the Department of Energy which stipulated 
tender documents should be readable by UK 
firms, OSO with authority to suggest additional 
bidders, bidders make estimates for UK contents 
and established criteria for bid evaluation among 
others [23].  
 
The OSO and National Enterprise Board 
provided subsided credit to support British firms. 
Also, Offshore Energy Technology Board 
provided funding for offshore related R&D. The 
Universities also received support in developing 
science and engineering programmes fit for the 
industry. Before restructuring the oil industry in 
Scotland, it was estimated that of the investment 
goods and services deployed about 30 per cent 
 
 
 
 
Obiri and Bjeirmi; JSRR, 25(5): 1-13, 2019; Article no.JSRR.53413 
 
 
 
5 
 
was domestically sourced. It was argued that this 
figure could be increased to 70 per cent thereby 
reducing imports and creating job opportunities in 
Scotland and north-east England (ibid). In 
assessing OSO’s impact after its formation, 
Civitas [23] argued that the organisation reached 
its target of 70 per cent UK content in 1979 and 
helped domestic companies in overcoming 
barriers to entry.  
 
2.3 Denmark  
  
The overall strategy of the policies of Denmark’s 
oil and gas industry is to provide for the 
appropriate use and exploitation of the country 
subsoil [24]. In terms of ownership of oil 
reservoirs, the Danish state is the sole owner 
under the Subsoil Act. However, the current 
emphasis is on energy security and an increase 
in the share of renewable energy. The country 
has considerable reserves of O&G in the North 
Sea which has been exploited since the early 
1970s. In 1962, A.P. Moller was offered a 50-
year concession by the Danish government to 
explore and produce oil and gas which 
subsequently led to the discovery of oil in Kraka 
field, North Sea by Dansk Undergrounds 
Consortium (DUC) joint venture [25]. After the 
first Danish oil crisis triggered by the Arab oil 
embargo in the 1970s, the government put in the 
necessary measures to ensure supply security. 
In 1976, the government of Denmark and A.P 
Moller entered an agreement granting the Danish 
National Oil and Gas Company (DONG) special 
privileges or pre-emption rights to gas (ibid).  
 
The second Danish oil crisis started in 1979 as a 
result of the Iranian revolution in the Middle East. 
Consequently, the Danish government 
renegotiated the terms and conditions of the 
concession with A.P.Moller which led to the latter 
giving up parts of the Sole Concession area 
(ibid). Since then, there have been about 7
th
 
licensing rounds in Denmark. In 2005, Denmark 
established a state-owned oil and gas companies 
called Nordsofonden and Nordsoenheden which 
manage the state participation in O&G 
exploration and production in the country. 
Nordsdonden replaced Danish Oil and Natural 
Gas Company’s responsibility as the state 
participant in licenses after the partial 
privatisation of DONG. The Danish North Sea 
Fund (Nordsofonden) which is non-operator 
owns 20 per cent of the DUC and all recent 
licences on behalf of the Danish government. 
Denmark increased its stake in the oil industry 
through ownership of various aspects of the 
value chain. For instance, the oil pipeline from 
the North Sea to the onshore processing facilities 
on the Jutland peninsula is owned and operated 
by the partially state-owned company, Ørsted 
[24].  
 
In Denmark, there are no local preference or 
domestic purchasing policies demanded of 
international oil companies for oil exploration 
[21]. They further argued that from the onset of 
the oil industry, most of the oil and gas-related 
work was performed locally which subsequently, 
import restrictions and domestic preferences 
became irrelevant due to EU rules (ibid). The 
Subsoil Act (1981) provides the principal legal 
framework regulating oil and gas exploration and 
production activities in the country [24]. The 
Ministry of Energy, Utilities and Climate is 
responsible for the overall strategy and policy 
(including oversight and supervision) for the 
development and regulation of the energy sector. 
In Denmark, there are no minimum requirements 
for the use of locally sourced goods, services, 
capital or personnel and neither are there any 
social programme payment made by an oil 
company (licensee) (ibid). EU regulations prohibit 
the legislation of local content requirements.  
 
3. LOCAL CONTENT DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 
The Gulf of Guinea, West Africa is renowned for 
natural resources ranging from petroleum 
resources to minerals. Paradoxically, these 
resources have led to underdevelopment which 
is hoped will be remedied through the adoption of 
local content policies. The countries chosen for 
the analyses are based on a combination of long 
years of experience (i.e. Nigeria) and newcomers 
(i.e. Liberia) ostensibly to gauge the policy 
implementation in different periods.  
 
3.1 Nigeria 
 
The Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act 2010 Act (NOGICD), is defined 
as “the quantum of composite value added to or 
created in the Nigerian economy by a systematic 
development of capacity and capabilities through 
the deliberate utilization of Nigerian human, 
material resources and service in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry” [26]. The NOGICD seeks to 
ensure substantial usage of domestic goods and 
services, and human capital (focus on value 
addition, and technology transfer) in all activities 
carried out in or connected with the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry. The act establishes the 
Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring 
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Board (NCDMB) and the Nigerian Content 
Consultative Forum to guide, monitor, coordinate 
and implement LC provisions and to serve as a 
forum for sharing ideas and experience on LC 
respectively. This law is an improvement on the 
previous laws on local content since the 1950s. 
For instance, the 1969 Petroleum Act stipulates 
protection for indigenous companies and the 
development of human capacity for the oil and 
gas industry. Again, the 1969 Petroleum Drilling 
and Production Regulations (PDPR)           
postulated nationalisation of petroleum resources 
in Nigeria.  
 
The intent behind these various laws was to 
domesticate the needs of the oil industry in 
Nigeria and reduce the domination of the industry 
by the international oil companies and their 
suppliers. Adewuyi and Oyejedi [27] argued that 
by 2005, the local content requirement had 
increased beyond a basic preference for 
domestic goods and services to the issuance of 
23 directives mandating the use of specific 
domestic goods and services. However, these 
LC regulations have never had any significant 
impact on the economy and as a result, yielded 
minimal returns. This is because, no provisions in 
the early PDPR for training required by indigenes 
employed in petroleum industry nor were there 
any set benchmarks (e.g., percentage) during 
licenses acquisition [19]. Also, it was noted that 
the provisions lacked guidelines for succession 
planning which resulted in a lack of uniformity in 
the application of the regulations from one entity 
to the other. 
 
The new act is comprehensive that outlines 
clearly defined strict enforcement of the LC policy 
and monitoring. The NCDMB argues that the 
policy has been successful in attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) above $500m between 
2010 to 2015 [28]. It is estimated that 70.87% of 
the contract value awarded in the upstream 
between 2010 and 2012 went to Nigerians, 
$110.8 million expended on domestic training of 
Nigerians (ibid). Going forward, the NCDMB is to 
pursue one hundred per cent fabrication of 
Floating Production Storage and Offloading 
(FPSO) in the next ten years and also increase 
indigenous oil production from current 10 per 
cent to 30 per cent in the next 5 years [28]. 
However, there remains an array of issues 
constraining local content policy implementation: 
weak infrastructure and industrial base 
(insufficient power supply, poor transportation 
telecommunication network, and inexistent public 
utilities etc.) in the country is inadequate to 
support industrial development, financial support 
to local firms; political instability, corruption and 
technical expertise [29,30,31].  
 
3.2 Angola 
 
Obiri et al. [2] postulate that local content 
implementation in Angola focusses on two broad 
areas: Angolanization of the workforce in the oil 
industry; and local sourcing of goods and 
services. Local sourcing of goods and services 
within the local content framework is based on a 
three-level typology: exclusivity, semi compliance 
and competition [32]. The rule of exclusivity 
implies that all activities that do not require non-
specialized know-how and high capital 
investment should only involve foreign 
companies at the sole request of Angolan 
companies. The semi compliance requires that 
for foreign companies’ involvement in all E&P 
activities that require a reasonable level of capital 
and specialized know-how, can only be permitted 
in association with national companies (ibid). And 
lastly, the competition system specifically 
encourages competition in the E&P industry 
which require a high level of capital and in-depth 
specialised know-how except under the 
conditions described above. However, the 
possibility of a partnership between local     firms 
and foreign companies should not be excluded.  
 
The above areas have been legislated through 
laws such as Law 10/79 empowering Sonangol, 
the state-owned oil company to lead in the 
exploration and production of O&G, and train 
indigenes. The decree 20/82, law 14/03, and 
decree 127/03 deal with Angolanization of the 
workforce, promotion of local private enterprises, 
sourcing of domestic goods and services 
respectively [33]. The primary legislations are the 
Petroleum Activity Law 2004 (Law 10/04), law for 
the Promotion of Business for Local Private 
Companies 2003 (Law 14/03). It also has the 
General Regulatory Framework for Hiring of 
Services and Goods from national companies in 
the oil industry (127/03). Decree 48/06 is on 
Open Tender Procedures in the oil industry, 
Decree Law 17/09 on the rules and procedure to 
observe in recruitment, integration, training and 
development of workers from the oil sector, and 
Decree 39/08 establishing a fund for the 
promotion of entrepreneurship [32]. In 2008, a 
fund for the promotion of entrepreneurship was 
established to support the creation of local 
companies.  
 
Apart from the above primary legislation and 
regulations, local content provisions are inserted 
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in the petroleum licensing agreements 
(Production Sharing Agreements) which mandate 
domestic sourcing of goods and training for local 
workers for oil companies and its subcontractors, 
i.e 2008 model PSA. The Angola Ministry of 
Petroleum has the sole responsibility for the local 
content formulation and implementation and 
monitoring. In a nutshell, the above legislation 
and regulations require preference to be given to 
Angolan concessionaires if their tender fees are 
not higher than 10% of other proposals, 
companies required to submit a detailed contract 
programme on the development of human 
resources and contribute financially to human 
resource development, locals employed are to 
enjoy the same conditions as foreigners,             
training programmes by IOCs must result in 
technology transfer and know-how, and finally, in 
terms of monitoring and enforcement, IOCs must 
submit annual human resources development 
plans, regular reports on contribution to training 
with failure resulting in fines and rendering 
contracts null and void. However, challenges 
persist in the area of infrastructure, financial 
support to local firms, technical expertise 
[2,33,34,35]. 
 
3.3 Ghana 
 
Following in the steps of Nigeria and Angola, 
Ghana’s local content policy framework has the 
key policy objective to “maximise the benefits of 
oil and gas wealth generation on a 
comprehensive local content platform by 
maximizing the use of local expertise, goods and 
services, job creation for people, businesses and 
financing in all aspects of the oil and gas industry 
value chain and retention of the benefit within 
Ghana” [36]. When the policy got passed in 
2013, it established a petroleum commission for 
regulating the upstream industry and a Local 
Content Committee for the monitoring and 
implementation of the local content regulations. 
To deepen local participation, petroleum 
agreement or license is awarded to foreign 
companies provided indigenous Ghanaian 
companies have 5% equity participation and 10% 
equity for of suppliers, and the establishment of 
Local Content Fund to support local capability 
development aspects of the local content 
framework and used primarily for education, 
training and research and development in the oil 
industry. In a nutshell, Ghanaian LC policy is 
modelled on Nigeria’s LC policy detailing 
procurement, technology and transfer 
requirements, training and employment 
preference in favour of indigenes in the award of 
rights, employment and sourcing goods locally. 
The local content fund is created to extend credit 
facilities to local companies to aid them to 
compete in the industry.  
 
The local content fund is to be funded via a 
contribution from licensed operators, oil and gas 
revenue, levies and support from Ghana’s 
development partners.  According to the 
legislation, contractors and its sub-contractors 
are expected to submit long term and annual 
local content plans, sub-plans in the areas of 
employment, training, succession, research and 
development (3-5-year programme of R&D 
initiatives in Ghana), and technology transfer. In 
addition to the establishment of the Local 
Content Committee, a common qualification 
system which serves as the sole system for the 
registration and pre-qualification of LC in the oil 
industry. A sole centralised system of pre-
qualified service providers in Ghana’s upstream 
petroleum industry based on their capacities, 
capabilities and local content strength is to 
enable ranking and categorisation of the service 
providers as well as tracking and monitoring their 
performance” [32]. The government policy 
framework on local content identified              
finance, technology and human resource 
capacity as the likely challenges to impede LCP 
implementation in Ghana [36]. The other 
challenge impeding policy implementation is 
weak infrastructure [2].  
 
3.4 Liberia  
 
Petroleum resources found in Liberia’s territorial 
borders as in most African countries belong to 
the state. In the late 1940s, oil and gas 
exploration began but was not successful from 
that period through to the 1990s. However, the 
discovery of commercial petroleum in the deep 
waters of the Gulf of Guinea renew interests in oil 
exploration in all the countries along the coast 
including Liberia. In 2012, oil was discovered. 
Subsequently, a technical committee was formed 
by the government with assistance from the US 
government, the Norwegian Oil for Development 
and other civil society organizations to develop a 
policy for the sector. The National Petroleum 
Policy 2012 sets the framework for the 
governance of the sector which covers thematic 
areas such as resource ownership and maritime 
boundary, legal framework and institutional 
oversight, licensing, state participation, revenue 
management, health, safety, and environment, 
and local content [37].  
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Liberia Petroleum policy contains a segment on 
local content that was developed and 
spearheaded by the Hydrocarbon Technical 
Working Committee comprising the president of 
the national oil company, minister of finance and 
energy etc. The central aims of the local content 
policy are: 
 
 To empower Liberians to participate and 
promote added value in the Liberian 
economy through the systematic 
development of capacity and the utilization 
of domestic human and material resources 
and services in the oil and related  
industry. 
 Developed a local content strategy to 
protect Liberian business interests and 
build local competence to derive maximum 
benefits from petroleum resources. 
 The law is expected to strengthen the local 
economy and ensure sustainable 
development [38].  
 
Localizing the production of services and 
materials in the country, it is hoped, the wider 
economy will benefit through spill-over effects. 
The government, therefore, will promote local 
content strategy aimed at building local 
businesses, local skills and workforce etc. 
through the establishment of training institutes to 
build specialized skills in strategic areas in the 
industry [37]. Oil companies are required to 
recruit and train Liberians, procure domestic 
goods and services, contribute to community 
development programs and undertake joint 
venture activities to ensure technology transfer 
(ibid). The Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy 
is the sectoral ministry in charge of petroleum 
matters and overall policy formulation and 
implementation in the sector. On reporting, oil 
companies are required to regularly publish their 
contribution to local content development 
publicly.  
 
On 17
th
 October 2019, the president of Liberia 
signed into law an amended version of 
Petroleum Act, 2019. The amended law focusses 
on attracting investments into the industry and 
increasing local participation. The national oil 
company of Liberia (NOCL) had an executive 
increment in the allocation of oil blocks from 2, 
000 sq. km to not exceed 3, 500 sq.km for 
offshore, and 2, 000 sq.km for onshore blocks 
[39]. The NOCL has the responsibility for the 
state’s commercial interests and equity 
participation in the oil fields. In addition to the 
above, the new law introduces international open 
competitive bidding, and executive allocation to 
the national oil company to be the basis for the 
granting petroleum agreement (ibid). The latter is 
granted in consultation with the national 
assembly, and thereafter the NOCAL can 
operate solely or through partnership. The law 
requires a petroleum agreement to contain at 
least 5 per cent total equity stake for               
domestic firms owned by natural persons of 
Liberia Citizenship. Local content provisions in 
the old Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Act, 2013 follows similar regulations in Nigeria, 
Ghana and Angola; requirement for training              
and employing locals, encouraging joint              
venture between foreign firms and local 
companies and increasing backward linkages to 
the industry. Liberia is in the same bracket as the 
other GGR countries facing challenges in 
financing local companies, infrastructure                      
for the expansion of the manufacturing base, and 
the requisite local manpower for the oil industry. 
 
3.5 Equatorial Guinea 
 
Similarly, Equatorial Guinea has a local content 
policy to compelled international oil companies 
and services providers to employ locals and the 
purchases of local goods and services. For 
instance, the Ministerial Order 1/2014 provides 
the policy framework for the regulation of the 
industry in Equatorial Guinea. This order enjoins 
that all petroleum contracts must have LC 
provisions geared towards employment creation, 
capacity development, and national industry 
participation [40]. In terms of employment, the 
policy framework requires the employment of the 
Equatoguineans and subsequently provided with 
training and skills required for the industry. The 
legal framework is expected to gradually diversify 
the national economy to an acceptable level of 
national companies’ participation in the country’s 
oil sector (ibid). In terms of skills development, 
the country lacks the requisite manpower needed 
locally to facilitate local participation in the sector. 
To that end, the regulatory framework 
incorporates capacity building programmes 
sponsored by the government in collaboration 
with the oil companies with resultant 
improvement in the level of local enterprises 
skills and ability to deliver quality goods and 
services (ibid).  
 
The Equatorial Guinea Liquefied Natural Gas’s 
(EGLNG) organizes courses in finance and 
accounting, human resource management, and 
computer skills etc. aimed in building local 
suppliers’ capacity [40]. Also, the oil companies 
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in collaboration with the government created the 
National Technological Hydrocarbons Institute to 
train technical workers for the industry. The local 
content policy also encourages joint partnership 
between local and foreign companies. To 
facilitate the implementation of the policy, 
institutions have been established by the state to 
aid in that process. There is an attempt to 
increase access to finance by local companies 
through the development of manual in 
partnership with the National Bank of Equatorial 
Guinea. The National Directorate of Local 
Content has the responsibility for the 
implementation and monitoring of the local 
content policy. The Ministry of Mines, Industry 
and Energy (MMIE) has the overall policy 
formulation and regulatory responsibility in the 
country’s oil and gas industry. Also, to ensure 
effective implementation of the policy frameworks 
there is the need to create an independent 
monitoring and evaluation institutional 
mechanism involving all the stakeholders in the 
industry [40]. 
 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
After the discovery of oil and gas in the North 
Sea and the Gulf of Guinea there was a general 
agreement as to the pivotal role of the state in 
maximizing benefits from the resources. State 
institutions were subsequently established with 
different functional responsibility to policymaking, 
technical management and commercial 
participation. These institutions, in turn, gave 
direction to the industrial policy arrived via 
consensus-building for long-term decisions 
especially in the case of Norway. Following in the 
footsteps of Norway, the regulatory functions of 
the oil industry was decoupled from the state oil 
companies’ commercial interests in the Gulf of 
Guinea regions. This resulted in the creation of 
an independent regulatory institution and also 
allowed state oil companies to focus on their 
main mandate of oil exploration and production 
as in the cases of Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia 
etc. Regulatory institutions in the Gulf of Guinea 
are weak in terms of implementation and 
monitoring compliance of the LC policy. This, 
therefore, requires regulatory institutions to be 
strengthened to act independently and monitor 
and implement the policy.  
 
The development of local content policy in the 
North Sea was predicated on existing state’s 
capabilities and developed human skills which 
propelled the growth of local businesses in and 
outside the oil sector. The existing skills and 
competencies in the North Sea countries were 
easily adjusted to the oil industry. In the case of 
the Gulf of Guinea countries, the manufacturing 
base is not well developed, and the existence of 
domestic skills and expertise is inadequate. The 
experience of the North Sea shows that the LC 
policy thrives in the presence of skilled and 
experienced workforce and education skills, and 
strong infrastructure and industrial base. Without 
adequate infrastructure, manufacturing base 
cannot be expanded, which in turn, cannot create 
backward and forward linkages to the oil 
industry. Put it differently as argued by Obiri et 
al., [2], there is a positive relationship between 
effective local content implementation and 
infrastructure development. That means, in 
drafting the LC policy the country developmental 
state must be taken into consideration, and the 
policy must align with the country long term 
development objectives. In Norway and the UK, 
the policy was for sectoral catch than economy-
wide policy.   
 
Furthermore, Norway and the UK had two 
different approaches towards the policy 
implementation: Norway’s LC policy was state-
led interventions which is more aligned with the 
policy implementation in the Gulf of Guinea 
region, and; UK’s LC policy was less 
interventionist as compared to Norway’s. In other 
words, the UK’s policy was more of laissez-faire 
towards oil companies’ compliance with the 
policy than the prescriptive nature as in the case 
of Norway and the Gulf of Guinea. In the North 
Sea, Norway and Denmark LC focused on R&D 
partnerships and knowledge transfer to domestic 
companies through domestic companies’ joint 
venture with IOCs, the UK implemented 
discretionary licensing system, audit oil 
companies’ purchases and offered financial 
support to local companies, establishment of 
independent state institutions to plan, monitor 
and report LC. In a bid to develop domestic 
capacity, there were industrial policies to develop 
domestic capacity in the oil industry. These 
actions resulted in establishing two state-owned 
companies in Norway and the state allowed 
competition among Norwegian companies 
(Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga-privately owned) 
to get best out of these companies.  
 
Consequently, there was temporary protection of 
indigenous companies to allow domestic 
participation in the oil industry in Norway. 
However, this policy of protectionism was 
temporary. Denmark followed a similar policy of 
establishing state-owned companies to 
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participate in the industry. Additionally, there was 
cooperation between the oil and gas industry and 
local universities that encouraged research and 
technology development which has not been 
replicated in the Gulf of Guinea region 
successfully. On the other hand, the lessons 
learned from the Gulf of Guinea region are 
establishment of regulatory institutions to 
implement and monitor the policy, the policy is 
mandatory in this region which mandates 
training, preferences for local goods and 
services, investment in R&D etc., petroleum 
licensing by IOCs requires 5 per cent                   
equity participation of local companies in the 
case of Ghana. Apart from financial and  
technical issues that plague national oil 
companies in the Gulf of Guinea, these 
companies have deviated from the core  
mandate into a quasi-financial institution granting 
loans to state institutions and venturing into a 
non-core mandate. In other words, these 
companies have turned into a slush fund for the 
government.   
 
The analyses of Gulf of Guinea countries show 
that the LC policy implementation has resulted in 
the establishment of production linkages in the oil 
sector. These are attributed to the independent 
regulatory institutions, stringent nature of the LC 
laws mandating local purchases of goods and 
services and joint ventures between foreign 
companies and locals, and annual reporting of 
targets. The LC law emphasises that priority shall 
be given to the local companies to demonstrate 
the capacity to execute the work. The capacity to 
execute the work is in-line with ‘full and fair 
opportunity’ (FFO) practised in the UK, Norway, 
Canada and Australia.  
 
In a nutshell, the studied regions have similarities 
in the LC provisions: either mandatory or 
voluntarily encouraging domestic sourcing of 
goods and services, and joint ventures to 
promote technology transfer to host countries. In 
the Gulf of Guinea region, the implementation of 
LC has succeeded in promoting some joint 
ventures between local firms and IOCs             
resulting in a limited transfer of knowledge and 
created direct and indirect jobs. However, the 
analysis of local content policy and its 
implementation in the Gulf of Guinea indicated 
that challenges persist in technical skills and 
financial capabilities of local contractors and 
suppliers, and inadequate infrastructure to 
support backward linkages. In terms of technical 
skills and lack of requisite manpower, this 
challenge exists as a result of inadequate and 
poorly resourced educational institutions 
emphasising vocational and technical training. 
Local companies and suppliers face difficulties in 
accessing credit facility primarily due to high-
interest rates on loan and huge collateral 
demanded by banks, and the general lack of 
government support in this regard. The 
infrastructure deficit in the GGR is due to 
insufficient investment in infrastructure 
development, inconducive and burdensome legal 
framework for private participation and corruption 
which is endemic and pervasive in the region. 
The above challenges apply to all the case 
countries in the Gulf of Guinea region. Another 
challenge is the volatile political environment in 
the form of insurgency, especially in Nigerian, 
Angola, and Liberia. This is attributed to the 
distribution of resource wealth, i.e. Niger Delta, 
Nigeria where the host communities normally feel 
they are not getting a fair share of their resource 
revenue. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Local content policy and its implementation in the 
Gulf of Guinea region follows the North Sea 
trend: employment, procurement, training, and 
technology transfer requirements, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, and the support 
generally given to local companies by host 
governments. The underpinning principle of “full, 
and fair opportunity” and reasonable access to 
employment and tendering opportunities for local 
suppliers and companies are incorporated in the 
local content policies in both regions. With active 
state involvement and regulations coupled with 
the utilisation of existing industrial and 
manufacturing capacity, the countries in the 
North Sea developed international competitive 
oil-related industries. Furthermore, the case 
studies show that for host countries to maximize 
enough benefits from the resources, the 
government must dedicate resources in creating 
the enabling environment for SMEs to partake in 
the industry. In stark contrast to the North Sea, 
LC in the Gulf of Guinea region countries 
(Ghana, Nigeria, and Angola) were promulgated 
without considering the developmental stage of 
their respective countries which pose as an 
impediment for SMEs development.  
 
To achieve the intended purposes of the policy in 
the Gulf of Guinea, challenges in areas of 
inadequate domestic skills, poor infrastructure, 
lack of technical and financial capacity of 
domestic firms and corruption must be 
addressed. Consequently, there must be an 
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investment in developing the human resource 
base, investing in R&D centres and encouraging 
partnership between the industry and the 
education sector as happened in Norway, UK 
and Denmark. In addition, the government 
should invest the petroleum resource revenue in 
infrastructure development and the development 
of an industrial base. Access to credit facility by 
local suppliers should be instituted by the 
government either solely or in collaboration with 
the private sector. The other issues that must be 
addressed are corruption and the effective 
running of state-oil companies. Finally, local 
content policy in the Gulf of Guinea is 
overambitious and therefore, must be re-drafted 
in collaboration with all stakeholders to reflect the 
economic conditions and the developmental 
state of the countries.  
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